艾尔波托·艾莱斯那(Alberto Alesina) ，也译为阿尔贝托-阿莱西纳。美国哈佛大学经济系政治经济学教授，因其针对政治与宏观经济之间的关系，所进行的理论和实证研究尤其是关于政治经济周期的研究而成为获奖热门人选。 
Alberto Francesco Alesina (born April 29, 1957) is an Italian political economist. He has published much-cited books and articles in major economics journals.
Harvard Faculty page. Alberto Alesina at CSA Celebrity Speakers Stock Exchange Of Visions: Visions of Alberto Alesina (Video Interviews) Web site of Voxeu.org Web site of LaVoce.info Alberto Alesina talks about his new book, "The Future of Europe" with Jenny Attiyeh on the interview program ThoughtCast!
简介编辑本段回目录
Alesina, Alberto，现任哈佛大学（Harvard University）Nathaniel Ropes政治经济学教授。曾先后任卡内基美隆大学（Carnegie Mellon University）政治经济学博士后研究员、经济学与政治经济副教授；国家经济研究局（National Bureau of Economic Research）Olin 研究员（Olin Fellow）；哈佛大学经济学和政府副教授、教授，政治经济Paul Sack副教授；麻省理工学院（MIT）经济学访问教授；哈佛大学经济系主任等职。
1985、1986分获哈佛大学经济学硕士、博士学位。
获奖情况与学术兼职编辑本段回目录
所获荣誉有：美国人文与科学院院士，计量经济学会会员，北京师范大学荣誉学位，慕尼黑CES经济学奖。所获资助有：先后获得卡内基梅隆大学政治经济博士后研究基金、国家经济研究局Olin研究基金、斯隆研究基金等。
兼职于：哈佛大学社会科学基础研究中心（Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences）、维泽赫德国际事务中心（Weatherhead Center for International Affairs）、欧洲研究中心（Center for European Studies）等。此外，还担当The Quarterly Journal of Economics、Economics and Politics联合主编，Journal of Economic Growth、The Quarterly Journal of Economics、European Economic Review、European Journal of Political Economy等杂志的副主编。
详解编辑本段回目录
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艾尔波托·艾莱斯那(Alberto Alesina)
他是一个意大利人，有着奔放的性格。他也是一个攀登者，喜欢挑战世界各地的高峰，去体验站在世界之颠的感觉。攀登者之意，寓意着不断攀登，向上，永远追求，永不停息；对生活充满激情和乐观的精神。
他现任哈佛大学政治经济学教授，经济学系系主任。同时也是美国国家经济研究局专家，经济政策研究中心专家。1985年获哈佛大学经济学硕士，1986年获哈佛大学经济学博士。
他是政治经济学的领军人物，曾于所有最重要的经济学术期刊发表多篇论文，和编撰多本著作。主要研究领域集中在：政治经济，宏观经济以及货币与财政政策，对欧洲的政治经济和财政政策也有颇深的研究。
他经常身为多间学院和机构的访问学者，游历美国和欧洲。包括多所著名大学、世界银行、国际货币基金组织和意大利财政部。他通过在各地深入的调查研究对多个经济问题进行研究。
艾尔斯那用内生经济增长理论，将收入分配作为影响经济增长的重要变量，讨论了收入分配不公对随后的经济增长的影响。他比较了欧美对于所得税的差异，20世纪70年代起欧洲所得税就快速增长，而美国的所得税却从20世纪80年代开始下降。所得税当然会影响到工作的积极性。它对家庭中主要的经济来源--男人或许影响有限，但却能影响女性参与到就业中来。毕竟，如果税后收入只够看孩子和雇保姆的花销，人们为什么要出去工作？
1990年， 《经济学人》杂志选他为全球四十岁以下，八位最优秀经济学家之一，并认为他将来极有可能获得诺贝尔奖。
艾莱斯纳 抗衡凯因斯编辑本段回目录
哈佛大学教授艾莱斯纳的研究，意外变成20国集团（G20）减债救经济的中心思想。
（彭博信息）
当今经济思潮中，谁人能与凯因斯的财政扩张看法抗衡？不是已经作古的诺贝尔奖得主傅利曼（Milton Friedman），而是53岁的哈佛大学经济学教授艾莱斯纳（Alberto Alesina）。
等等，谁是艾莱斯纳？
意大利籍的艾莱斯纳并非无名小卒，他曾担任过哈佛经济系主任，现任讲座教授。但直到今年春季之前，少有人能想到他的经济理论居然变成G20共同减债的理论核心，成为政府「退场机制」的指导方针。
今年4月是艾莱斯纳跃上国际舞台的时刻，他在马德里向欧盟财金首长报告说，「大规模、可接受、且明确的」降低预算赤字措施通常会伴随着经济成长，他强调这是对1980年代以来数国的历史实证分析所导出的结论。两个月后，G20元首便在多伦多共同发表声明，要在2013年前至少把预算赤字砍半，可能迫使美国追随英国和德国，加入缩小赤字缺口的行列。前年还执行得如火如荼的财政刺激作法，今年突然变成政府避之唯恐不及的罪恶。
以艾莱斯纳与其它财政节约派的观点来看，希腊引爆的欧洲债信危机，就是欠债过度引发的信心问题。减债有助恢复信心，从而再次刺激经济增长，正是各国应该服用的药方。艾莱斯纳深信，撙节措施稳定债市后可以压低利率，于是促进投资，进而刺激经济成长。削减赤字也能消除纳税人疑虑，让他们相信政府不会推出更痛苦的财政调整方案，进而提高民众消费意愿。艾莱斯纳说，削减支出和增税都能缩小赤字，但前者更有利经济成长。欧盟财长会议的正式公报指名道姓地援引艾莱斯纳的看法，使艾莱斯纳成为和凯因斯政策抗衡的主将。
然而，艾莱斯纳的历史研究无法解释美国紧缩预算可能发生什么情况，因为美国与他研究过的案例截然不同。像美国这种已经实行零利率政策、预算赤字依然庞大的例子非常罕见，零利率环境下紧缩财政支出的案例更是稀少。
日本的经验或许是美国的教训，日本政府曾在1990年代经济需求疲软、接近零利率的情况下削减赤字，许多经济学家认为这是日本陷入「失落十年」的祸首。不过，日本当年平衡预算的主要工具是增税，并非艾莱斯纳建议的降低政府支出。
艾莱斯纳的研究也显示，削减赤字的结果好坏参半。他发现，1980年至今有26件案例显示缩减赤字能伴随国内生产毛额（GDP）的成长，有21案显示削减赤字有助缩小政府债务；但是能同时出现经济增长与政府减债的案例仅有九件，其中包括2000年的爱尔兰，2006年的荷兰与挪威，不过这些都不是像美国这种规模的经济体。
艾莱斯纳承认，零利率环境下缩减赤字的案例少之又少，但他还是建议各国加快紧缩财政的脚步，因为政府过度举债引发的金融危机是阻碍全球成长的最大风险。
于是艾莱斯纳成为前美国总统小布什的经济顾问曼奎（Gregory Mankiw）之后，最具影响力的财政鹰派人士。一位在美国执教的意大利学者，成为推动德式反举债看法的风云人物。对于德国领头的严苛财政削减作法，艾莱斯纳说：「我认为德国是对的。」（取材自彭博商业周刊）
哈佛教授：削减政府支出是经济复苏关键编辑本段回目录
导读：哈佛大学政治经济学教授阿尔贝托-阿莱西纳(ALBERTO ALESINA)9月15日在《华尔街日报》发表署名专栏文章，结合历史上财政调整政策产生的影响进行了分析，指出促进一个国家经济发展的有效途径总是来自削减支出和控制税收。以下为文章摘译：
政治家们认为当前美国需要的是更多的刺激支出，而非削减支出，其理由是刺激支出将有利于加快经济复苏。然而，恐怕事实与这一观点恰恰相反。历史证明，削减政府支出从而降低财政赤字水平可能是促进经济复苏的关键所在。
当前欧洲再次陷入衰退的风险并非来自一些成员国政府实施的财政紧缩政策，而是受到了主权债务负担过重以及众多银行倒闭的威胁。今年7月进行的压力测试并不可靠，因为他们并没有测试欧洲银行面临主权债务的能力，如果将此考虑在内，许多银行将会走向倒闭，而那些银行仍然是对欧洲经济的威胁所在。
同时，在美国，近来的刺激计划已经证明“乘数效应”、即政府支出每增加一美元对GDP产生的影响很小。此外，刺激支出就意味着不远的将来必将会迎来税收增加，而这也会进一步威胁经济增长。
经济历史表明，众多财政政策大幅调整中，如果调整基于明确的削减支出目标，通常都会促使经济扩张而不是衰退。相反，如果财政政策的调整是基于税收的增加，那么一般来说都会导致经济疲软。
我和我的同事西尔维亚-阿尔达尼亚(Silvia Ardagna)近来共同完成了一篇研究这种模式的论文。我们的论文着眼于1970年至2007年间，发生在经济合作与发展组织(OECD)中21个国家的107项财政调整政策。
根据我们的研究模式，一个经历了扩张性财政调整、并在调整当年及第二年国内生产总值比率实现上涨的国家在经合组织中占了25%，而在随后迎来经济萧条的国家却占到了75%。
研究结果十分惊人。在近40年的时间里，扩张性调整大部分建立在削减支出基础上，而衰退性调整则大部分建立在增加税收的基础之上。此外，建立在削减支出基础上的调整通常会同时迎来国家债务在GDP中所占的比例持续下降。
在论文中，我们还审查了界定为使赤字在GDP中所占比例周期性上涨至少1.5%的、近年来庞大的财政扩张。通过对91个案例的研究，我们发现，削减税收的扩张性要远远超出增加支出。
那么，削减支出是如何具有扩张性的呢？首先，此举会发出“未来并不会迎来税收增加”这样一个信号，或者即使出现幅度也不会太大。一项降低政府支出的可靠计划将会显著改变人们对未来税收负债的预测，而这必将会改变人们的行为。如果消费者尤其是投资人预计在一段时间内支出与税收都是有限的，那么他们将会更愿意支出。相反，以增加税收为基础的财政调整会缩减消费者的可支配收入并降低其消费动力。
当前美国企业是盈利的，并且拥有大量未使用资源。但监管与税收的不确定性阻碍了他们进行有风险的投资和消费。在欧洲，如果支出得以削减并且违约风险降低，那么政府将会强化银行部门，并使信贷更多地流向私营领域。
因此，财政调整的构成至关重要。基于我们的了解，相比削减支出，美国和欧洲增加刺激支出承担的风险要更大。
欧洲似乎总结了过去几十年的教训。事实上，欧洲当前所有调整财政政策的国家都致力于削减支出，而并不是增加税收。然而如果支出不能迅速缩减，美国的财政政策却意味着迟早迎来更高的税收。
过去40年的证据表明，增加支出便会刺激经济、而增加税收便会降低赤字的逻辑恐怕不太可能实现，反之或许可以成立。(李婧)
主要著作与论文编辑本段回目录
著作：
1. Il Liberismo é di Sinistra,Il Saggiatore, September 2007 (In Italian, with Francesco Giavazzi). Translation: Bulgarian.
2. The Future of Europe: Reform or Decline, MIT Press, September 2006 (with Francesco Giavazzi). Translations: Greek, Korean, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish.
3. Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, April 2004 (with Edward Glaeser). Translations: French, Italian.
4. The Size of Nations, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, November 2003 (with Enrico Spolaore).Senso non Comune (in Italian), EGEA, Università Bocconi Press, Milan, Italy, May 2002.
5. Designing Macroeconomic Policy for Europe, CEPR, London, UK, March 2001 (with Olivier Blanchard, Jordi Gali, Francesco Giavazzi, and Harald Uhlig).
6. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, November 1997 (with Nouriel Roubini and Gerald Cohen). Translation: Italian.
7. Partisan Politics, Divided Government and the Economy, Cambridge University Press, January 1995 (with Howard Rosenthal).
编写：编辑本段回目录
1. Institutional Reforms in Colombia, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, January 2005. Editor and author of Introduction, and coauthor of two chapters. Spanish translation by Fedesarrollo.
2. Currency Unions, November, Hoover Institution, 2001. Editor and author of one chapter and of Introduction (with Robert Barro).
3. Politics and Economics in the 1980s, University of Chicago Press and NBER, September 1991. Editor and author of Introduction (with Geoffrey Carliner).
论文：编辑本段回目录
1. “Why Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?” Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming 2008 (with Filipe Campante and Guido Tabellini).
2. “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks,” Journal of Public Economics, April 2008, 92, 426-447 (with Guido Tabellini).
3. “Electoral Rules and Minority Representation in U.S. Cities,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2008, 128: 325-58 (with Philippe Aghion and Francesco Trebbi.
4. “Good Bye Lenin (or not?) – The Effect of Communism on People’s Preferences,” American Economic Review, September 2007, 97: 1507-1528 (with Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln).
5. “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task,” American Economic Review, March 2007, 97: 169-79 (with Guido Tabellini), reprinted in D. Masciandaro and M. Quintyn (2007), Designing Financial Supervision
6. Institutions: Independence, Accountaiblity and Governance, Edward Elgar, UK.
7. “Choosing (and Reneging on) Exchange Rate Regimes,” Journal of the European Economic Association, June 2006, 4:770-99 (with Alexander Wagner).
8. “Conflict, Defense Spending and the Number of Nations,” European Economic Review, January 2006, 50: 91-120 (with Enrico Spolaore).
9. “Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Stabilizations,” IMF Staff Papers, Mundell-Fleming Lecture, 53: 1-49, 2006 (with Silvia Ardagna and Francesco Trebbi).
10. “Work and Leisure in the U.S. and Europe: Why So Different?” NBER Macroeconomic Annual 2005, 1-64 (with Edward Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote).
11. “Corruption, Inequality and Fairness,” Journal of Monetary Economics, October 2005, 52: 1227-44 (with George-Marios Angeletos).
12. “Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance,” Journal of Economic Literature, September 2005, 43: 721-61 (with Eliana La Ferrara).
13. “Fairness and Redistribution: US vs. Europe,” American Economic Review, September 2005, 95: 913-35 (with George-Marios Angeletos).
14. “War, Peace and the Size of Countries,” Journal of Public Economics, July 2005, 89: 1333-54 (with Enrico Spolaore).
15. “What Does the European Union Do?” Public Choice, June 2005, 123: 275-319 (with Ignazio Angeloni and Ludger Shuknecht).
16. “International Unions,” American Economic Review, June 2005, 95: 602-15 (with Ignazio Angeloni and Federico Etro).
17. “Regulation and Investment,” Journal of the European Economic Association, June 2005, 3: 791-825 (with Silvia Ardagna, Giuseppe Nicoletti, and Fabio Schiantarelli).
18. “Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities,” Journal of Public Economics, May 2005, 89: 897-931 (with Eliana La Ferrara).
19. “The European Union: A politically incorrect view,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 2004, 26-48 (with Roberto Perotti)
20. “Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities,” Journal of Political Economy, April 2004, 112: 348-96 (with Reza Baqir and Caroline Hoxby).
21. “Endogenous Political Institutions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2004, 119: 565-612 (with Philippe Aghion and Francesco Trebbi).
22. “Inequality and Happiness: Are Americans and Europeans Different?” Journal of Public Economics, August 2004,88: 2009-42 (with Rafael Di Tella and Robert McCulloch).
23. “The Size of Countries: Does It Matter?” Journal of the European Economic Association, Schumpeter Lecture, June 2003, 301-16.
24. “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth, June 2003, 8:155-94 (with Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain Wacziarg).
25. “Optimal Currency Areas,” NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 2002, 301-55 (with Robert Barro and Silvana Tenreyro), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
26. “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?” American Economic Review, September 2002, 92: 1126-37 (with Beatrice Weder).
27. “Who Trusts Others?” Journal of Public Economics, August 2002, 85: 207-34 (with Eliana La Ferrara).
28. “Fiscal Policy Profits and Investment,” American Economic Review, June 2002, 92: 571-89 (with Silvia Ardagna,Roberto Perotti and Fabio Schiantarelli).
29. “Currency Unions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2002, 117: 409-30 (with Robert Barro).
30. “Redistribution Through Public Employment: The Case of Italy,” IMF Staff Papers, November 2001, 48: 447-73(with Stephan Danninger and Massimo Rostagno).
31. “Why Doesn’t the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?” Brookings Paper on Economics Activity,Fall 2001, 187-278 (with Edward Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote).
32. “Dollarization,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 2001, 91: 381-85 (with Robert Barro).
33. “Economic Integration and Political Disintegration,” American Economic Review, December 2000, 90: 1276-96(with Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg), reprinted in R. Pornfret (2004), Economic Analysis of Regional Trading Agreements, Edward Elgar, UK.
34. “Redistributive Public Employment,” Journal of Urban Economics, September 2000, 48: 219-41 (with Reza Baqirand William Easterly).
35. “Participation in Heterogeneous Communities,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2000, 115: 847-904 (withEliana La Ferrara).
36. “The Political Economy of the Budget Surplus in the US,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 2000, 14: 3-19.
37. “Who gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic Growth, March 2000, 5: 33-64 (with DavidDollar).
38. “Polarized Platforms and Moderate Policies with Checks and Balances,” Journal of Public Economics, January2000, 75:1-20, (with Howard Rosenthal).
39. “Is Europe Going Too Far?” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Volume, supplement of Journal of MonetaryEconomics, December 1999, 1-42 (with Romain Wacziarg).
40. “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1999, 114: 1243-84 (with RezaBaqir and William Easterly).
41. “Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America,” Journal of Development Economics, August 1999,59: 233-53 (with Ricardo Hausmann, Rudolf Hommes and Ernesto Stein).
42. “Tales of Fiscal Adjustments,” Economic Policy, October 1998, 27: 489-545 (with Silvia Ardagna).
43. “Openness, Country Size and the Government,” Journal of Public Economics, September 1998, 69: 305-322 (withRomain Wacziarg).
44. “Economic Risk and Political Risk in Fiscal Unions,” Economic Journal, July 1998, 108: 989-1009 (with RobertoPerotti).
45. “The Political Economy of Fiscal Adjustments,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 1998, 197-266(with Roberto Perotti and Jose Tavares).
46. “The Welfare State and Competitiveness,” American Economic Review, December 1997, 87: 921-39 (with RobertoPerotti).
47. “On the Number and Size of Nations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1997, 112: 1027-56 (with EnricoSpolaore).
48. “Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries: Composition and Macroeconomic Effects,” IMF Staff Papers, June 1997,44: 297-329 (with Roberto Perotti).
49. “A Theory of Divided Government,” Econometrica, November 1996, 64:1311-42 (with Howard Rosenthal).
50. “The 1992, 1994 and 1996 Elections: A Comment and a Forecast,” Public Choice, June 1996, 88: 115-25 (with JohnLondregan and Howard Rosenthal).
51. “Reducing Budget Deficits,” Swedish Economic Policy Review, Spring 1996, 3: 113-34 (with Roberto Perotti).
52. “Income Distribution, Political Instability and Investment,” European Economic Review, June 1996, 40: 1202-29(with Roberto Perotti).
53. “Political Instability and Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Growth, June 1996, 2:189-213 (with Sule Ozler,Nouriel Roubini and Philip Swagel).
54. “Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1996, 401-407 (with Roberto Perotti).
55. “Fiscal Expansions and Adjustments in OECD Economies,” Economic Policy, October 1995 n. 21: 207-48 (withRoberto Perotti).
56. “Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Costs?” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings,May 1995, 85:196-200 (with Roberta Gatti).
57. “Taxation and Redistribution in an Open Economy,” European Economic Review, May 1995, 39:961-80 (withRoberto Perotti).
58. “Together or Separately? Issues for Political and Fiscal Unions,” European Economic Review, Papers andProceedings, April 1995, 39: 951-58 (with Roberto Perotti and Enrico Spolaore).
59. “The Political Economy of Budget Deficits,” IMF Staff Papers, March 1995, 42:1-31 (with Roberto Perotti).
60. “The Politics of Growth: A Survey of the Recent Literature,” World Bank Economic Review, September 1994, 8:351-72 (with Roberto Perotti).
61. “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1994, 109:465-90 (with DaniRodrik). Reprinted in Grossman G. and J. Viner (eds.), Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence, Edward ElgarPublishing Co., UK, 1995.
62. “On the Feasibility of a One-Speed or a Multi-Speed European Monetary Union,” Economics and Politics, July1993, 5:145-66 (with Vittorio Grilli).
63. “Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence,” Journal of Money,Credit and Banking, May 1993, 25:151- 62 (with Lawrence Summers).
64. “A Model of the Political Economy of the United States,” American Political Science Review, March 1993, 87:12-33(with John Londregan and Howard Rosenthal). Reprinted in Paul Peretz (ed.), The Politics of American Economic
65. Policy Making, Second Edition, 1996, Sharpe Publishing.
66. “Electoral Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies,” European Journal of Political Economy, March 1993, 9:1-24(with Gerald Cohen and Nouriel Roubini).
67. “Default Risk on Government Debt in OECD Countries,” Economic Policy, Fall 1992, 15:427-63 (with Mark deBroeck, Allessandro Prati and Guido Tabellini).
68. “Political Cycles in OECD Economies,” Review of Economic Studies, October 1992, 59:663-88 (with NourielRoubini). Reprinted in T. Persson and G. Tabellini, (eds), Monetary and Fiscal Policy, M.I.T. Press,1994.
69. “Positive and Normative Theories of Public Debt and Inflation in a Historical Perspective,” European EconomicReview, April 1992, 36:337-44 (with Guido Tabellini).
70. “Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies,” Economics and Politics, March 1992, 4:1-30 (withGerald Cohen and Nouriel Roubini). Reprinted in A. Cukierman, Z. Hercovitz and L. Leiderman (eds.), ThePolitical Economy of Business Cycles and Growth, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1992.
71. “Why are Stabilizations Delayed?” American Economic Review, December 1991, 81:1170-1188 (with AllanDrazen). Reprinted in T. Persson and G. Tabellini, (eds), Monetary and Fiscal Policy, M.I.T. Press, 1994; alsoreprinted in F. Sturzenegger and M. Tommasi (eds.), The Political Economy of Reform, MIT Press, 1998, pp. 77-103.
72. “Fiscal Adjustment, the Real Exchange Rate and Australia''s External Balance,” Australian Economic Review, July-September 1991, 95:38-51 (with David Gruen and Matthew Jones).
73. “Evaluating Rational Partisan Theory: A Response,” Economics and Politics, March 1991, 3:63-72.
74. “The Politics of Ambiguity,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1990, 105:829-50 (with AlexCukierman).
75. “A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt,” Review of Economic Studies, July 1990, 57:403-14(with Guido Tabellini).
76. “Voting on the Budget Deficit,” American Economic Review, March 1990, 80:37-49 (with Guido Tabellini).Reprinted in T. Persson and G. Tabellini, (eds.), Monetary and Fiscal Policy, M.I.T. Press, 1994.
77. “External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk,” Journal of International Economics, November 1989, 27:199-220(with Guido Tabellini). Spanish translation in Estudios Economicos, Fall 1989, 4:237-60.
78. “Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy,” American Political Science Review, June1989, 83(2):373-98 (with Howard Rosenthal). Reprinted in J. Silbey (ed.), The Congress of the United States, 1789-1989, Carlson Publishing Inc., 1991. Japanese translation in Public Choice Studies, Spring 1990, 15:5-17.
79. “Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies,” Economic Policy, 1989, 8:55-98. Spanish translation inEstudios Economicos, Madrid, 1991. Reprinted in Paul Whiteley (ed.) Economic Policy, Edward Elgar Pub. 1998,Vol.II 66-106; and in P.N. Junankar (ed.) The Economics of Unemployment, Edward Elgar Pub. UK, 1998.
80. “An Overlapping Generation Model of Electoral Competition,” Journal of Public Economics, December 1988,37:359-79 (with Stephen Spear).
81. “Can Speculative Attacks on EMS Currencies Be Avoided?” Il Giornale degli Economisti, December 1988, 47:537-44 (with Vittorio Grilli).
82. “Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-party System with Rational Voters,” American Economic Review,September 1988, 78:796-806.
83. “Macroeconomics and Politics,” NBER Macroeconomic Annual 1988, 13-52, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
84. “Credibility and Politics,” European Economic Review, May 1988, 32:542-50 (with Guido Tabellini).
85. “Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984,” Journal of Money Credit and Banking,February 1988, 20:63-82 (with Jeffrey Sachs).
86. “Rules and Discretion with Non-coordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policy,” Economic Inquiry, October 1987, 25:619-30 (with Guido Tabellini).
87. “Macroeconomic Policy in A Two-party System as a Repeated Game,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August1987, 102:651-78. Reprinted in T. Persson and G. Tabellini, (eds.), Monetary and Fiscal Policy, MIT Press, 1994.Reprinted in D.Mueller (eds.), The Economics of Politics Edward Elgar Publishing Co. London UK, 2001.
88. “Rules, Discretion and Reputation in A Two-party System,” Il Giornale degli Economisti, February 1987, 46:3-27.
89. “Inflation, Indexation and Macroeconomic Stability,” Il Giornale degli Economisti, February 1983, 42:91-112 (inItalian with English summary).
90. “Le tariffe pubbliche: il caso dei trasporti urbani,” (“Pricing in Public Enterprises: The Case of PublicTransportation”), Economia Pubblica, June 1980, 10(6):223-28 (with Vittorio Grilli).
相关链接编辑本段回目录
参考文献编辑本段回目录
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alberto_Alesina
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/usstock/c/20100915/17408663105.shtml
http://udn.com/NEWS/WORLD/WOR2/5719254.shtml
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/usstock/c/20100915/17408663105.shtml
http://udn.com/NEWS/WORLD/WOR2/5719254.shtml
